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EMPLOYMENT LAW—EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION—
UNNECESSARILY DUPLICATIVE: HAS THE SIXTH CIRCUIT GONE TOO FAR IN 
UPHOLDING AN EMPLOYER’S ABILITY TO REQUIRE INCUMBENT 
EMPLOYEES TO PROVIDE DOCTOR’S NOTES AFTER TAKING SICK LEAVE? 
Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3D 245 (6th Cir. 2011). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider a typical American, Joe, who has come down with a case of 
the flu. Joe’s flu is not an extraordinary event and occurs only once this 
year. He takes a week off from work, feels better, and returns to the office. 
Upon his return, Joe’s employer requires him to provide a doctor’s note de-
tailing both the nature of his illness and whether he can still perform the 
essential duties of his job. Being a good employee, he obliges. Seems fairly 
innocuous, does it not? Suppose, however, that Joe was not out of the office 
for a week suffering from the flu, but instead took time off because of com-
plications from HIV, depression, alcoholism, drug abuse, or any other po-
tentially embarrassing or stigmatized illness. Would he be so willing to dis-
close those types of illnesses to his employer? Moreover, despite any mis-
givings he might have, could his employer still require him to disclose 
them? 
This note examines the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent ruling in 
Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio,1 which upheld a Columbus, Ohio police de-
partment policy (“the Columbus policy”) that required incumbent employ-
ees to provide a doctor’s note to their immediate supervisor explaining both 
the nature of their illness and their fitness to return to duty.2 The Columbus 
policy is a blanket provision, applying to any incumbent employees that use 
either three or more days of sick leave for themselves or two or more days 
of sick leave due to an illness in the immediate family.3 Lee contradicts the 
  
 1. 636 F.3d 245 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 2. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incumbent 
(last visited June 8, 2013). For the purposes of this note, the term “incumbent employee” is 
defined as an employee who holds a position of permanent employment with an employer. 
 3. Lee, 636 F.3d at 248. The full text of the Columbus policy was included in the Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion: 
1.  All Personnel 
a. Notify the Information Desk to mark up prior to returning to reg-
ular duty. 
b. If any of the following conditions apply, forward a note from the 
attending physician to [the Employee Benefits Unit] upon returning 
to regular duty: 
 
714 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
majority rule as stated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Conroy v. New York Department of Correctional Services.4 In this case, 
employers were precluded from enacting a similar policy that required in-
cumbent employees to provide a doctor’s note to their immediate supervisor 
after using sick leave unless doing so served a vital business interest.5 
In analyzing the recent development of a circuit split on this issue, Part 
II of this note6 will first discuss a brief history of the Rehabilitation Act as it 
applies to incumbent employee discrimination.7 It will then discuss a brief 
history of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as it applies to in-
cumbent employee discrimination—including a discussion of the ADA’s 
general prohibition against employer-mandated medical examinations and 
inquiries. Part II will conclude with a discussion of how both the ADA, and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) 
continued the long-standing policy of protecting incumbent employees 
against employer-mandated medical examinations and inquiries, even in the 
face of prior court decisions that attempted to curtail the scope of the ADA.8 
Part III of this note will critique Lee’s holding. It will first discuss9 how 
Conroy’s holding has developed into the majority rule amongst the Circuit 
  
(1) More than three days of sick leave were used. The 
physician’s note must state the nature of the illness and 
that you are capable of returning to regular duty. 
(2) Previously notified by a commander to do so. The 
physician’s note must state the nature of the illness and 
that you are capable of returning to regular duty. 
(3) More than two days of sick leave were used due to 
illness in the immediate family. The physician’s note 
must state the nature of the family member’s illness and 
that you were required to care for the family member. . . 
. 
(4) You were assigned to restricted duty. The physi-
cian’s note must state that you are capable of returning 
to regular duty. 
c. Submit a copy of your physician’s note to your immediate super-
visor.  
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 4. 333 F.3d 88, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (b) (2006). In Lee, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the 
Rehabilitation Act was applicable to the plaintiffs’ case because the Rehabilitation Act speci-
fies that the standards used to determine whether the Act has been violated are the same 
standards applied under the ADA. 636 F.3d at 250. 
 8. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3553–54 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009)). 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
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Courts of Appeal.10 Next, it will advocate that the Sixth Circuit could have 
reached the same conclusion while still following the majority rule.11 Part III 
will then discuss how the Sixth Circuit’s ruling goes too far in expanding an 
employer’s ability to require both incumbent employees and their families to 
disclose private medical information, essentially arguing that the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s ruling in Lee is unnecessarily duplicative.12 Part III maintains that the 
majority rule would be the preferable approach in future judicial decisions 
because it would continue to limit an employer’s ability to access private 
medical information about incumbent employees and their immediate fami-
lies, and would also protect the vital role that family caregivers play in con-
temporary society.13 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Rehabilitation Act 
In 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibited state 
and local governments from discriminating against individuals with disabili-
ties.14 The Rehabilitation Act represented the culmination of many years of 
congressional efforts to provide a level playing field for individuals with 
disabilities.15 The Rehabilitation Act had its shortcomings, however. Specif-
ically, the Rehabilitation Act failed to address incumbent employee discrim-
ination.16 Prior to the ADA’s enactment, seven circuits had held that no pri-
vate right of action existed under the Rehabilitation Act.17   
The absence of a private right of action under the Rehabilitation Act 
severely limited an incumbent employee’s ability to sue his or her employer 
for discrimination experienced while on the job.18 Regardless of this short-
coming, the Rehabilitation Act’s impact was, nevertheless, illustrative of 
  
 10. See, e.g., Indergard v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 582 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
 12. See infra Part III.C-1. 
 13. See infra Parts III.C-2, III.C-3; see also, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Why Care 
About Caregivers? Using Communitarian Theory to Justify Protection of “Real” Workers, 
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 355, 410–11 (2010). 
 14. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (b) (2006). 
 15. See Kathleen D. Henry, Civil Rights and the Disabled: A Comparison of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in the Employment 
Setting, 54 ALB. L. REV. 123, 123 (1989). 
 16. See Chai R. Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act: A View from the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 522 n.9 (1991) (“refer-
ring solely to affirmative action in employment decisions”). 
 17. See Janet A. Flaccus, Discrimination Legislation for the Handicapped: Much Fer-
ment and the Erosion of Coverage, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 81, 88 (1986). 
 18. Id. at 87–89. 
716 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
Congress’s intent to cure discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 
The Rehabilitation Act now serves as both a precedent and a guidepost for 
interpreting the ADA, because the ADA extended the Rehabilitation Act’s 
core principles (providing a level playing field for individuals with disabili-
ties) to private employers.19 
Both before, and shortly after, the ADA’s enactment, existing anti-
discrimination laws (such as the Rehabilitation Act) were “predominantly 
[litigated] to protect the existing positions of incumbent workers.”20 In fact, 
Congress specifically enacted the ADA within this period of predominant 
incumbent-employment litigation with far more sweeping provisions than 
previously enacted, thus protecting incumbent employees’ rights in a way 
that the ADA’s preceding legislation failed to do.21 
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
The ADA’s primary objective is “to provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.”22  Essentially, the ADA seeks to completely eliminate 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities, regardless of where the 
discrimination may present itself. Accordingly, the ADA does not limit its 
scope to pre-employment decisions, nor does the ADA apply only to states 
and local governments. The ADA, instead, represents Congress’s attempt at 
broad-reaching legislation that provides a level playing field for individuals 
with disabilities in all aspects of life. 
The ADA places a heavy emphasis on regulating private employers. 
The ADA continues to prohibit adverse hiring decisions against individuals 
because of their disability (just as the Rehabilitation Act did), and also goes 
further by precluding private employers from discriminating against any 
individual under any “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment” 
because of a disability.23 Put another way, the ADA specifically includes 
incumbent employees within its scope. The ADA not only prohibits the dis-
crimination of potential applicants, but specifically forbids discrimination 
against those with a disability in any employment decision.24 The ADA’s 
construction also provides a strong incentive for employers to accommodate 
  
 19. See Feldblum, supra note 16, at 521–22. 
 20. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991). 
 21. See Feldblum, supra note 16, at 522. 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).  
 24. Id. (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis 
of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, [or] job training . . . .”). 
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any employees with a disability already on the job.25 The accommodation 
mandate is the strongest of these incentives because it requires noncompli-
ant employers to pay added costs for their noncompliance.26 
One of the most significant regulations of private employers came from 
Congress’s efforts to restrict an employer’s use of employer-mandated med-
ical examinations and inquiries.27 These restrictions applied to both potential 
applicants and incumbent employees.28 Under these restrictions, employers 
cannot use either medical examinations or medical inquiries to determine 
whether an applicant or an incumbent employee has a medical condition or 
disability “unless such [an] examination or inquiry is shown to be job-
related and consistent with business necessity.”29 The ADA basically recog-
nized that employer-mandated medical examinations and inquiries could 
also be an avenue for discrimination. Congress was particularly concerned 
with the notion that employers could discover either an applicant’s or an 
incumbent employee’s disability through medical examination and inquiry 
policies, and, thus, an applicant or an incumbent employee could face dis-
crimination.30 This notion was especially troubling for Congress, because 
discrimination may not occur if employers are dissuaded from enacting a 
medical examination or inquiry policy.31 
Congress heavily debated this portion of the ADA. Prior to the ADA’s 
passage, Congress forged a compromise that specifically regulated pre-
employment medical screenings in a way that ensured applicants with disa-
bilities could ultimately determine whether their disabilities prevented them 
from being hired.32 By extension, this compromise also limited an employ-
er’s ability to require incumbent employees to submit to further medical 
examinations and inquiries once on the job.33 Congress incorporated the 
  
 25. See Seth D. Harris, Law, Economics, and Accommodations in the Internal Labor 
Market, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 1, 8 (2007). 
 26. See id. at 59–60. Professor Harris argues that the costs and uncertainties associated 
with an incumbent employee’s lawsuit under the ADA are effective methods of ensuring 
employers comply with the ADA’s accommodation mandate. Id. “The most obvious way for 
the employer to avoid a discrimination claim and the attendant litigation costs is to provide 
the employee with an accommodation that she finds acceptable.” Id. at 60. 
 27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). 
 28. Id. See also Feldblum, supra note 16, at 530 (“One of the key aspects of the ADA’s 
employment title is a series of restrictions on the use of medical examinations and inquiries, 
both during the application process and after individuals have been employed.”). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
 30. See Feldblum, supra note 16, at 531, 539. 
 31. Id. at 538 (“As a practical matter, this restriction on the use of medical examination 
and inquiry results, together with potential liability for unwarranted disclosure of medical 
information, may convince many employers not to require broadrange medical examinations 
and inquiries.”). 
 32. Id. at 531.  
 33. Id. at 538.  
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underlying policy of the Rehabilitation Act by stipulating that an incumbent 
employee’s on-the-job performance was the best indicator of his or her abil-
ity to perform the job for which he or she was hired.34 Nevertheless, Con-
gress also recognized that circumstances could theoretically arise where an 
incumbent employee was no longer capable of performing his or her job due 
to a medical condition.35 
This tension between an employer’s objectives in ensuring that incum-
bent employees remain capable of performing their essential job functions, 
balanced against Congress’s intent to prevent employers from discriminat-
ing against incumbent employees because of their disabilities, gave rise to 
the ADA’s “vital business interest” test. Accordingly, the ADA’s final ver-
sion allowed employers to inquire about an incumbent employee’s medical 
conditions only to determine whether an incumbent employee “remain[ed] 
qualified for the job.”36 Employer-mandated medical examinations and in-
quiries, therefore, had to be “job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity.”37 In other words, these inquiries could not be arbitrary. Neither Con-
gress nor the ADA’s proponents, however, intended for the bill to prohibit 
voluntary medical examinations and inquiries of either applicants or incum-
bent employees.38 This concession is instructive, as it further evidences that 
both Congress and the ADA’s proponents intended to eliminate only the 
unjustifiable demands of involuntary medical examinations and inquiries.39 
The ADA’s proponents sought this elimination because both parties were 
aware that such involuntary policies could compel either applicants or in-
cumbent employees to disclose a misunderstood or socially-stigmatized 
medical condition, including HIV, cancer, or diabetes against their will.40 
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act 
After the ADA became law, incumbent employees, rather than appli-
cants who were denied employment because of a disability, continued to 
bring the vast majority of discrimination claims.41 Commentators continued 
to criticize this paradox as counterproductive to the ADA’s policy objec-
tives, particularly because the wide availability of litigation under the ADA, 
  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Feldblum, supra note 16, at 538.  
 37. Id. at 538–39 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(4)(A) (2011)).  
 38. See id. at 540. 
 39. Id. at 539. 
 40. Id. at 533. 
 41. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Review Essay, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Re-
duced Employment for People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 537 
(2004). 
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allegedly, does not ultimately protect incumbent employees against discrim-
ination.42 Notwithstanding such criticisms, however, Congress declined to 
curtail incumbent employees’ rights to sue their employers for ADA viola-
tions when Congress enacted the ADAAA in 2008.43 Congress recognized 
that recent rulings by the Supreme Court of the United States had actually 
narrowed the ADA’s scope in a manner that Congress had not intended un-
der the original legislation.44 Therefore, Congress took it upon itself to cure 
the Court’s recent circumspection of the ADA. 
D. Summary 
Four things are evident from this historical analysis: First, Congress did 
not intend for the ADA to be limited only to applicants denied employment 
based upon their disability, nor did Congress intend for the ADA to be ap-
plicable only to public employers. Second, Congress clearly intended for 
incumbent employees to have the right to sue their employers for discrimi-
nation under the ADA. Third, Congress did not intend to curb incumbent 
employees’ rights to sue their employers when Congress enacted the 
ADAAA in 2008. On the contrary, Congress clearly intended to expand 
incumbent employees’ already-existing rights within the ADA framework. 
Finally, Congress specifically contemplated the discriminatory potential for 
employer-mandated medical examinations and inquiries, and, therefore, 
intended to place rigorous restrictions on their use. 
  
 42. See id. at 536 (arguing that incumbent employees suing their employers under the 
ADA may cause an overall decrease in the incentive of employers to initially hire applicants 
with disabilities); see also Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 20 (believing the massive in-
crease in the number of cases under the ADA may “impose a significant burden on federal 
judges”).  
 43. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2009)) 
 44. Id. § 2(a). The Supreme Court rulings specifically mentioned by Congress as having 
curtailed the ADA’s scope were the following: First, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471 (1999), upheld the defendant-airline’s decision to reject a pair of myopic sisters’ 
applications for employment on the ground that the sisters’ myopia was not a disability be-
cause they could correct their impairments with corrective lenses. Second, Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing of Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), held that impairments 
alone do not constitute a disability unless the impairment prevents or severely restricts an 
individual from performing tasks that are central to his or her daily life. Williams is particu-
larly instructive of how far the Supreme Court of the United States went in disassembling the 
ADA. The plaintiff in Williams was, in fact, an incumbent employee who brought suit against 
her employer for allegedly failing to make reasonable accommodations for her carpel tunnel 
syndrome while she remained on the job. Id. at 187. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
A. Prior to Lee, the Second Circuit’s Ruling in Conroy Became the Major-
ity Rule 
Conroy was not a case of first impression in interpreting the ADA’s re-
striction on employer-mandated medical examinations and inquiries. Before 
Conroy, a trend emerged in other circuits in which the courts began to scru-
tinize an employer’s necessity for medical examinations and inquiries, thus 
requiring them to be construed more carefully around the ADA’s business 
necessity standard. 
For example, in 1997, the Tenth Circuit held that an employer’s new 
drug and alcohol testing policy requiring incumbent employees to disclose 
whether they were taking prescription drugs violated the ADA’s medical 
examinations and inquiries provision.45 The Sixth Circuit went further in 
1999, holding that in order for an employer to request an incumbent em-
ployee to submit to a medical exam, the employer had to show that there 
was “significant evidence that could cause a reasonable person to inquire as 
to whether an employee [was] still capable of performing his job.”46 In 2001, 
the Third Circuit interpreted the ADA’s business necessity standard to mean 
that job-related medical examinations must be consistent with a business 
activity, thus, limiting them “only to the extent necessary under the circum-
stances to establish the employee’s fitness for the work at issue.”47  
Later that same year, the Ninth Circuit elaborated further on this con-
cept, articulating that the ADA’s business necessity standard is a high stand-
ard to meet.48 The Ninth Circuit opined that neither business efficiency nor 
expedience should ever provide a justifiable rationale in determining wheth-
er the business necessity standard has been met in a particular case.49 
Then came Conroy. In 2003, the Second Circuit considered a blanket 
employment provision that required incumbent employees to submit a doc-
tor’s note to their employer after taking multiple days of sick leave.50 In this 
case, the Second Circuit continued to cement the trend developing in other 
circuits by ardently requiring employers to prove that any policy that re-
quired an incumbent employee to disclose a medical reason for taking sick 
  
 45. Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1230–31 (10th 
Cir. 1997). 
 46. Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 47. Tice v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 515 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 48. Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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leave actually served a vital business interest.51 The court required employ-
ers to “first show that the asserted ‘business necessity’ is vital to the busi-
ness,” and not merely arbitrary.52 Although a vital business interest could 
include a need to ensure workplace safety, or even to cut down on “egre-
gious absenteeism,” a mandatory medical inquiry, nevertheless, could be 
broader or more intrusive than necessary to serve the employer’s vital busi-
ness interests.53 
The court, therefore, outlined a two-part disjunctive test to determine 
whether an employer’s mandatory medical inquiry serves a vital business 
interest.54 Under the first part of the test, any mandatory medical inquiry 
must be directed at determining whether the incumbent employee can still 
perform work-related duties, and the employer bears the burden of showing 
that a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason exists to doubt the incumbent 
employee’s ability to perform these work-related duties.55 Under the second 
part of the test, any employer inquiry as to whether an incumbent employ-
ee’s absence is for legitimate medical reasons requires the employer to show 
it has reason to suspect the incumbent employee is abusing its attendance 
policy.56 
The Second Circuit further harmonized its ruling with Congress’s orig-
inal sensitivity to potential acts of discrimination that could arise from a 
mandatory medical inquiry program.57 Specifically, the court speculated that 
certain types of medical treatments, if disclosed to an employer, might com-
pel an incumbent employee to disclose either an actual disability or even a 
perceived disability.58 The Second Circuit mentioned chemotherapy as an 
example, alluding to the fact that cancer treatment may require an incum-
bent employee to take significant amounts of sick leave, and, consequently, 
a mandatory medical inquiry would compel the incumbent employee to dis-
close to his or her employer that he or she has cancer.59 
After Conroy, several circuit courts and many federal district courts 
began to coalesce around Conroy’s holding and further developed Conroy 
into the majority rule. The Eighth Circuit became the first to adopt the Se-
cond Circuit’s reasoning.60 The court recognized that employer-mandated 
medical examination and inquiry policies were not the only means available 
  
 51. Id. at 97. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 97–98. 
 54. Id. at 98. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Conroy, 333 F.3d at 98. 
 57. Id. at 96. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (citing Fountain v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 190 F. Supp. 2d 335, 339 
(N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, vacated in part, Conroy, 333 F.3d at 98).  
 60. Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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to achieve an employer’s vital business interests.61 Instead, the Eighth Cir-
cuit prescribed a more objective approach, stating that employer-mandated 
medical examinations or inquiries “must be a reasonably effective method to 
achieve the employer’s goals.”62 In Indergard v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,63 
the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit when it reasoned that re-
quiring incumbent employees to disclose the nature of their use of sick leave 
“went beyond simply measuring [the incumbent employee’s] physical abil-
ity to perform job tasks and could have revealed a disability.”64  
The federal district courts followed suit, neglecting opportunities to 
distinguish Conroy in circumstances analogous to the facts in both Conroy 
and Lee, despite Congress’s recent enactment of the ADAAA in 2008. For 
example, in 2008, a district court found an almost carbon copy of the police 
department policy in Lee to be a violation of the ADA.65 Another district 
court held that “questions broadly seek[ing] information about illnesses, 
mental conditions, or other impairments [an incumbent employee] has or 
had in the past”66 violates both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.67 Final-
ly, even a district court within the Sixth Circuit relied heavily upon 
Conroy’s reasoning when rendering its opinion.68 
By the time the Sixth Circuit issued its ruling in Lee, the Second Cir-
cuit’s ruling in Conroy represented well-established law across many cir-
cuits. Rulings that favored Conroy’s approach continued to rigidly restrict 
an employer’s ability to require incumbent employees to submit to medical 
examinations or inquiries.69 These rulings also continued to elaborate and 
expand on Conroy’s analysis, further explaining that an employer could 
satisfy its vital business interests by means other than mandated medical 
examinations and inquiries.70 In addition, these rulings continued to touch 
upon the Second Circuit’s noted policy objections to employer-mandated 
medical inquiries and examinations, agreeing that they could compel an 
incumbent employee to involuntarily reveal a disability to his or her em-
ployer.71 
Moreover, these revelations could expose an incumbent employee to 
discrimination. By the time the Sixth Circuit decided Lee, several circuits 
  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (citing Conroy, 333 F.3d at 98).  
 63. 582 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 64. Id. at 1057. 
 65. Pa. State Troopers Ass’n v. Miller, 621 F. Supp. 2d 246, 253–65 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 
 66. Scott v. Napolitano, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1084 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
 67. Id. at 1084–85. 
 68. See Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1011 (S.D. Ohio 2009), 
overruled, 636 F.3d 245, 257–59 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 69. See, e.g., Indergard v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 582 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 70. See, e.g., Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 71. See, e.g., Indergard, 582 F.3d at 1056. 
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had decided to err on the side of caution, and on the side of incumbent em-
ployees, by further pressuring employers to meet the very high burden of 
showing that their mandated medical examination and inquiry policies con-
stitute absolute necessities to the vital interests of the business.  
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Reasoning Goes Too Far in Expanding an Employ-
er’s Ability to Require the Disclosure of Private Medical Information 
About Both Incumbent Employees and Their Families 
In Lee, the Sixth Circuit reversed course and upheld the Columbus Po-
lice Department’s medical inquiry policy.72 The Columbus policy, however, 
was substantially different from the policy under review in Conroy.73 In 
Conroy, the New York Department of Corrections’ policy required incum-
bent employees to bring only a “medical certification” attesting to their fit-
ness to return to work after an absence.74 The Columbus policy was far more 
intrusive. It required all incumbent employees to submit a doctor’s note—
not just a medical certification—stating the nature of their illness to their 
immediate supervisors if more than three sick days were used.75 Even more 
intrusive, if an incumbent employee took only two or more days of sick 
leave to take care of a family member, the policy required a doctor’s note 
stating the nature of the family member’s illness.76 
In upholding the Columbus policy, the Sixth Circuit relied heavily on 
the fact that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) 
published guidelines permit an employer to request that incumbent employ-
ees provide a doctor’s note upon return from sick leave, as long as the em-
ployer requires all incumbent employees to do so.77 A reading of these very 
same EEOC guidelines, however, lends credence to the idea that the Sixth 
Circuit’s ruling went too far in supporting the Columbus policy. 
The EEOC guidelines imply that an employer’s necessity for receiving 
such information from an incumbent employee may be satisfied by either a 
doctor’s note or by some other explanation.78 Consistent with both the Se-
cond Circuit’s ruling in Conroy and with the majority rule, an employer-
  
 72. Lee, 636 F.3d at 261. 
 73. See Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Lee, 636 F.3d at 248. 
 76. Id. For the full text of the Columbus policy as published in the Sixth Circuit’s opin-
ion, see supra note 3. 
 77. Lee, 636 F.3d at 255. 
 78. See Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations 
of Employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), THE U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (July 27, 2000), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-
inquiries.html [hereinafter “EEOC Guidelines”]. The relevant section is found at Question 
15. 
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mandated medical inquiry is not the only means available to an employer to 
discover why an incumbent employee has taken sick leave. The language 
“doctor’s note or other explanation” is indicative of this assessment.79 Ac-
cordingly, the EEOC Guidelines upon which the Sixth Circuit relied so 
heavily do not suggest that the required procurement of a doctor’s note is the 
only way an employer can discover an incumbent employee’s reason for 
taking, or having taken, sick leave. Indeed, the EEOC Guidelines specifical-
ly refuse to foreclose the possibility that other, more reasonable methods 
may be available. 
The EEOC guidelines also make no mention whatsoever of an employ-
er’s ability to require incumbent employees to disclose the nature of their 
family members’ illnesses if sick leave was taken for that purpose.80 The 
only place where the EEOC guidelines mention any disability-related inquir-
ies for family members is contained within a separate section.81 This section 
permits an employer to make a disability-related inquiry against an incum-
bent employee, and only an incumbent employee, after receiving infor-
mation learned from another person, such as a family member.82 Another 
mention of family members is made in a footnote, which protects a family 
member’s genetic information from a disability-related inquiry encompassed 
within a request for an incumbent employee’s genetic information.83 
Nothing within the EEOC guidelines would seem to support an em-
ployer policy of requiring incumbent employees to disclose the nature of a 
family member’s illness to an immediate supervisor when sick leave is used 
to care for a family member. Nevertheless, it was upon an expansive reading 
of the EEOC guidelines that the Sixth Circuit ultimately determined that the 
required family member disclosure portion of the Columbus policy was not 
a violation of the ADA.84 
Notwithstanding such a liberal interpretation of the EEOC guidelines, 
the EEOC guidelines are not binding on the courts and merely constitute 
persuasive authority.85 Moreover, no language within the EEOC guidelines, 
the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, or the ADAAA would have precluded the 
Sixth Circuit from adopting the majority rule and invalidating portions of 
the Columbus policy—particularly the portions of the Columbus policy that 
  
 79. Id. (“An employer is entitled to know why an employee is requesting sick leave. An 
employer, therefore, may ask an employee to justify his/her use of sick leave by providing a 
doctor’s note or other explanation, as long as it has a policy or practice of requiring all em-
ployees, with and without disabilities, to do so.”).  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. The relevant section can be found at Question 6. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. The relevant section can be found at both Question 1 and footnote 21. 
 84. Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245, 257 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 85. See White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 812 (6th Cir. 2004).  
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required an incumbent employee’s family member to disclose the nature of 
his or her illness to, in essence, a stranger. 
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Lee is also perplexing given the court’s 
history. In several prior opinions, the Sixth Circuit has recognized an abun-
dance of privacy rights in circumstances closely analogous to an incumbent 
employee’s family member’s right to medical privacy. 
For instance, the Sixth Circuit held in Kallstrom v. City of Columbus86 
that the right to privacy protects a person’s personal security interests, but 
the court also recognized a constitutional right to bodily integrity.87 
Kallstrom also held that the plaintiff-officers’ constitutional rights to privacy 
and bodily integrity outweighed the City of Columbus’s interest in releasing 
the plaintiff officers’ addresses, phone numbers, and driver’s licenses to 
defense counsel in response to a discovery request.88 The question must be 
asked: If a constitutional right to privacy protects against the disclosure of 
an individual’s driver’s license, phone number, or address, according to the 
Sixth Circuit, why does that very same right to privacy not protect private 
medical records and diagnoses? 
The Sixth Circuit also held in Bloch v. Ribar89 that a right to privacy 
extends to a person’s sexuality.90 The Bloch court found that an individual’s 
choices about sex are of such an intimate nature that they define an individ-
ual.91 Again, the question must be asked: If a constitutional right to privacy 
protects a person’s sexuality, according to the Sixth Circuit, why are medi-
cal diagnoses or conditions that may arise from sexual conduct immune 
from the very same protection? 
For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Lee goes too far. Neither 
the EEOC guidelines, the ADA, nor the ADAAA provide the appropriate 
legislative framework for the Sixth Circuit to maintain that an employer-
mandated medical inquiry policy is not in violation of the ADA. Moreover, 
nothing within the EEOC guidelines, the ADA, or the ADAAA would have 
precluded the Sixth Circuit from continuing the trend developing within 
several circuits to adopt Conroy as the majority rule. Furthermore, the Sixth 
Circuit’s ruling in Lee unnecessarily tramples the rights of an incumbent 
employee’s family member’s right to medical privacy. It definitively up-
holds the Columbus policy’s provision requiring incumbent employees to 
disclose the nature of a family member’s illness when sick leave is used for 
that purpose. Given the history of the Sixth Circuit, its refusal to invalidate 
  
 86. 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998).  
 87. Id. at 1062–63. 
 88. Id. at 1069. It should be noted that the plaintiff-officers in Kallstrom were undercov-
er police officers. 
 89. 156 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 1998).  
 90. Id. at 685–86. 
 91. Id. at 685.  
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the Columbus policy’s family member provision is troubling because it evi-
dences a clear departure from the Sixth Circuit’s trend of expanding and 
protecting individuals’ constitutionally protected privacy rights. 
C. The Majority Rule Would Have Resolved the Conflict in Lee Without 
Requiring Incumbent Employees to Disclose Private Medical Infor-
mation About Both Themselves or Their Families 
1. Most of the Columbus Policy Would Likely Have Been Upheld 
Under the Majority Rule 
Had the Sixth Circuit followed the majority approach, the bulk of the 
Columbus policy would likely have been upheld as being consistent with the 
ADA’s principles and protections against employer discrimination of in-
cumbent employees while continuing to significantly restrict the use of em-
ployer-mandated medical examination or inquiry policies. Indeed, had the 
Sixth Circuit followed the majority rule, the Columbus policy still would 
likely have permitted the Columbus Police Department to inquire into both 
the nature of its police officers’ use of sick leave and their capability to per-
form their jobs. At the same time, the Sixth Circuit would have correctly 
concluded that requiring police officers to disclose the nature of their family 
members’ illnesses was far too intrusive. Had it followed the majority rule, 
the Sixth Circuit would have invalidated the family-member portion of the 
Columbus policy. 
To review, Conroy outlined a two-part disjunctive test to determine 
whether an employer-mandated medical inquiry satisfied a vital business 
interest.92 Under the first part of the test, the Columbus Police Department 
bore the burden of showing two things: First, that a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason existed to doubt an incumbent employee’s ability to 
perform work-related duties; second, that the medical inquiry was directed 
to determine whether the incumbent employee could perform work-related 
duties.93 
On its face, the Columbus policy appears to meet both elements of the 
first part of Conroy’s disjunctive test, and, therefore, the policy—as it ap-
plies to incumbent employees—would likely have been upheld by the Sixth 
Circuit had it followed the majority rule. In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit 
recognized that the policy was universal, applying to all incumbent employ-
  
 92. Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 93. See id. The second part of the test requires the employer to show that it has a reason 
to suspect an incumbent employee is abusing the employer’s attendance policy. See id.  Be-
cause the Sixth Circuit in Lee did not state any facts that would indicate the Columbus policy 
was enacted for this reason, a review of the Columbus policy’s viability under that portion of 
the test will not be discussed here. 
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ees regardless of their disability status.94 Because the Columbus policy was a 
blanket provision that applied to all incumbent employees, any argument 
that it was designed to discriminate against incumbent employees with disa-
bilities would not have been persuasive. Furthermore, both the EEOC guide-
lines and the ADA support the use of employer-mandated medical inquiry 
programs as long as they apply to all employees and do not single out in-
cumbent employees that the employer suspects of having a disability.95 
The Columbus policy also satisfies a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason to inquire into an incumbent employee’s ability to perform a job. The 
policy specifically requires that any police officer taking three or more days 
of sick leave must submit to an immediate supervisor a doctor’s note attest-
ing to both the nature of the illness and fitness to return to regular duty.96 
Police officers perform very demanding jobs, requiring careful attention to 
detail and quick decision-making in high-stress situations. Errors in judg-
ment, including errors that result from split-second decisions, can lead to an 
abundance of problems ranging from wrongful arrest to death. 
Under the Eighth Circuit’s more objective approach, which held that 
employer-mandated medical inquiries needed to be reasonably effective to 
achieve the employer’s goals,97 the Columbus policy appears to be reasona-
bly effective at determining whether police officers returning from extended 
sick leave are still capable of performing their jobs. Furthermore, even 
though the Second Circuit was concerned that employer-mandated medical 
examination and inquiries could tend to reveal a disability,98 the Columbus 
Police Department’s interest in ensuring that police officers returning to 
regular duty are still capable of performing their jobs would likely have 
overridden this concern.  
In addition, although the policy in Conroy pertained to correctional of-
ficers99—a similar role to that of a police officer that requires high-stress, 
quick decision-making—the Sixth Circuit would have acted reasonably if it 
had distinguished the custodial nature of the prison guards in Conroy from 
the prosecutorial and investigational nature of the police officers in Lee. 
Even if this distinction was dubious at best, the Sixth Circuit could have 
affirmed the Columbus policy as it applied to police officers on street patrol 
and exempted the Columbus policy as it applied to dispatchers, desk work-
ers, or other in-house staff who perform the same, or similar, custodial and 
administrative tasks as correctional officers. 
  
 94. Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245, 257 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006); EEOC Guidelines, supra note 78. 
 96. Lee, 636 F.3d at 248. 
 97. See Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527–28 (8th Cir. 2007).  
 98. Conroy, 333 F.3d at 95. 
 99. Id. at 91. 
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Nevertheless, the underlying policy of ensuring that police officers re-
turning from extended sick leave are still capable of performing their jobs is 
still reasonable under Conroy’s vital business interests test. Suppose a police 
officer took time off from work after contracting infectious mononucleo-
sis,100 or any other illness that may impair a police officer’s ability to per-
form effectively under pressure. Such information is of vital importance to 
the Columbus Police Department, which would have a strong interest in 
ensuring the safety of the citizens it has been charged to serve and protect. 
When confronted with the information that a police officer returning from 
extended sick leave is suffering from an ailment that may significantly im-
pact his or her ability to perform the high-stress nature of police work, an 
immediate supervisor would then be able to take corrective action. 
Suppose, however, that a police officer took extended sick leave to re-
ceive treatment for influenza.101 Then, the reverse is true. No corrective ac-
tion would need to be taken; the police officer can return to work. The Co-
lumbus Police Department’s interest in being able to make this type of 
judgment call overrides an individual police officer’s fear that a disability 
may be revealed. 
The Columbus policy, as it pertains to incumbent employees, also 
clearly intends to determine whether a police officer could still perform 
work-related duties. No invidious or arbitrary reason for requiring police 
officers to comply with the policy appears to exist. Indeed, the policy specif-
ically mentions that police officers are to provide a doctor’s note attesting to 
both the nature of their illness and their ability to return to regular duty fol-
lowing a return from extended sick leave.102 Had the Columbus policy only 
inquired into the nature of the illness, without also requiring a doctor’s certi-
fication that a police officer could return to duty, it would have been a clear 
violation of the ADA under Conroy.103 Because both the nature of the police 
officer’s illness and the fitness to return to duty were under review, howev-
  
 100. The symptoms of infectious mononucleosis include, but are not limited to, sore 
throat, fever, malaise, and extreme fatigue. See MURRAY LONGMORE ET AL., OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL MEDICINE 389 (7th ed. 2007). 
 101. Unlike infectious mononucleosis, which can cause illness for an extended period of 
time, see id., “[m]ost people who get influenza will recover in a few days to less than two 
weeks . . . .” Seasonal Influenza (Flu), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last 
updated Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/symptoms.htm. Influenza 
symptoms are typically less severe, and “estimates of flu-associated deaths in the United 
States range[d] from a low of about 3,000 to a high of about 49,000 people” between 1976 
and 2007. Id. 
 102. Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 2011).  
 103. 333 F.3d at 91–92. The policy in Conroy only required employees returning from 
sick leave to submit a general diagnosis, which allowed the Department of Corrections, and 
not a doctor, to make the determination as to whether the employee was fit to return to duty. 
Id.  
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er, and because the police officer’s attending physician made a determina-
tion on both questions, the Columbus policy passes muster—but only with 
regard to police officers under the department’s employ. 
2. The Majority Rule Would Have Correctly Determined that Re-
quiring Immediate Family Members to Disclose the Nature of 
Their Illness Violated the ADA. 
The Columbus policy’s validity pertaining to a police officer’s imme-
diate family is a different matter. Indeed, the portion of the Columbus policy 
that required the disclosure of a family member’s illness when sick leave 
was taken for that purpose was clearly inapposite of the majority rule.  
First, no justifiable rationale appears to exist whereby a police officer’s 
fitness to return to regular duty could be substantially impacted by taking 
care of an ill family member at home and off the clock. Although a police 
officer’s caring for a family member who is suffering from the sudden onset 
of a disability or even attending to a family member in the final throes of a 
terminal illness may have some impact on the officer’s ability to perform 
effectively under pressure, so do a variety of other life-changing events. The 
death of a family member arguably would have the same impact (or more), 
as would a child’s poor performance in school, a contentious divorce, or a 
substantial change in the family dynamic such as the loss of a spouse’s job. 
Yet the Columbus policy does not require a police officer to disclose that 
they have taken sick leave for any of these purposes.104 Instead, the Colum-
bus policy is only concerned with family members’ illnesses or disabilities.  
Second, the very nature of the family member portion of the Columbus 
policy is not necessary to determine whether a police officer could still per-
form his or her job. It makes little, if any, difference whether a family mem-
ber suffers from an illness, particularly when the incumbent employee’s on-
the-job performance remains the best indicator of whether he or she is still 
capable of performing his or her job. A husband’s actual and physical abil-
ity to perform the duties expected of him as a police officer is unlikely to be 
affected because his wife has terminal cancer. And even if a police officer’s 
family member suffers from a communicable illness, such as HIV, the fami-
ly member’s suffering from the disease is unlikely to impact the police of-
ficer’s actual and physical ability to perform his or her job unless the police 
officer subsequently contracts HIV. If that occurs, the valid portion of the 
Columbus policy reflecting the majority rule—the portion that applies only 
to incumbent employees—would then be applicable.  
Put another way, only after a police officer has contracted an illness 
can the police officer’s ability to perform his or her job be questioned, and, 
  
 104. See Lee, 636 F.3d at 248.  
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even then, only after the police officer has taken extended sick leave. There 
is no need to inquire into the health of a police officer’s family. No compel-
ling policy interest is served by requiring family members to submit to a 
policy that has little, if any, affect on a police officer’s ability to perform his 
or her job. Accordingly, had the Sixth Circuit followed the majority rule, the 
portion of the Columbus policy applying to family members would have 
been invalidated. This approach would have been preferable because, under 
the majority rule, only a police officer’s fitness to return to duty is at issue. 
A family member’s ability to return to duty in a job that he or she does not 
occupy is not. 
D. The Majority Rule is the Preferable Approach Because It Would Con-
tinue to Limit an Employer’s Ability to Receive Private Medical In-
formation About Its Employees or Their Families 
1. After Conroy, Legal Scholars Have Expressed Their Support for 
the Majority Rule 
Legal scholars have supported the majority rule for many of the same 
reasons as the Second Circuit. These scholars have maintained that the ma-
jority rule would continue to prevent an employer from requiring incumbent 
employees to comply with a policy that may reveal a disability unless it 
served a rigidly-applied vital-business-interests test.105 At the same time, the 
majority rule would prevent employers from creating a record of an incum-
bent employee’s medical history and, thus, potentially misclassifying him or 
her as having a disability.106 
In enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that not all discrimination 
would flow from an incumbent employee’s actual disability, but, instead, 
from other forms of discrimination.107 Initially, the ADA envisioned protec-
tions for incumbent employees under a “regarded as” prong, most often used 
when an incumbent employee faces discrimination based upon society’s 
misconceived notions about a disability or a disease.108 The ADA, however, 
also envisioned protections for incumbent employees under a “record of” 
prong, which would protect them from being labeled as an individual with a 
disability—regardless of whether the label was correctly or incorrectly at-
  
 105. See Alex B. Long, (Whatever Happened to) The ADA’s “Record Of” Prong(?), 81 
WASH. L. REV. 669, 683–84 (2006). 
 106. See id. at 683 (“[T]he fact that Congress used the ADA to place limitations on the 
ability of employers to require medical examinations or inquire into the medical histories of 
job applicants and employees supports the conclusion that [it] was meant to serve at least 
some role in protecting individuals with conditions associated with stigma.”). 
 107. Id. at 680. 
 108. Id. 
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tached.109 The ADA’s legislative history supports this argument, showing 
that Congress was concerned with “record of” violations because the mis-
classification of an incumbent employee as an individual with a disability 
usually arose from a tangible record of some kind.110 
Because the potential for discrimination to flow from a tangible record 
of some kind is possible, an enforcement of the majority rule would resolve 
this problem. It would preclude an employer from obtaining a “record of” an 
incumbent employee’s alleged disability by foreclosing an employer’s op-
portunity to acquire several doctor’s notes after many extended absences. 
Regardless of the reason for any extended illnesses, an employer would be 
unable to obtain an extensive record of doctor’s notes on incumbent em-
ployees, and, by extension, would be less likely to discriminate against in-
cumbent employees for any disabilities, real or imagined, that such an ex-
tensive record of doctor’s notes would imply. 
The policy for preventing discrimination against incumbent employees 
misclassified as having a disability is a strong one. Legal scholars have ar-
gued that misclassified incumbent employees require the same level of pro-
tection from discrimination under the ADA as individuals with disabili-
ties.111 Medical examinations and inquiries create the possibility that an em-
ployer may discriminate against an incumbent employee based upon an ex-
amination of the incumbent employee’s medical history.112 In addition, the 
stigma of a misclassified disability is the same as an actual disability, and, as 
with an actual disability, a misclassified disability may follow incumbent 
employees throughout their employment at a particular job, thus, providing 
the potential for discrimination over a long period of time.113 
Support for the majority rule would also operate as a deterrent to em-
ployers, dissuading them from making even passive inquiries into their in-
cumbent employees’ medical histories.114 Under the ADA, incumbent em-
ployees without disabilities may sue their employers for inquiring into their 
medical histories if the inquiry is neither job-related nor consistent with a 
business necessity.115 Furthermore, once an employer receives medical in-
formation about an incumbent employee under an employer-mandated med-
  
 109. Id. at 681. 
 110. Id. at 681–82. The “record of” prong was also designed to protect individuals who 
have recovered, either in full or in part, from previous illnesses. See id. at 684–85. 
 111. See Long, supra note 105, at 682–84. 
 112. Id. at 684. 
 113. Id. at 682. 
 114. See Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans 
with Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 345–46 
(2009). 
 115. Id. at 345. 
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ical inquiry policy, the employer is required to comply with stringent confi-
dentiality requirements in the care and custody of that information.116 
This policy presents significantly higher risks to employers than aban-
doning employer-mandated medical examination and inquiry policies alto-
gether unless they served a vital business interest. First, employers would be 
required to consult legal counsel to ensure their policy does not amount to a 
passive inquiry into an incumbent employee’s medical history. Second, em-
ployers would be required to consult legal counsel to ensure the policy is 
job-related and consistent with a business necessity. Third, employers would 
be required to ensure that any medical information obtained under the policy 
remains sufficiently confidential, and that stringent safeguards are in place 
to ensure such medical information does not fall into the wrong hands. The-
se requirements are three potential landmines that expose the employer to 
significant liability for noncompliance, including expenses related to the 
defense of a lawsuit and the costs associated with any injunctive relief or 
with the payment of any damages as ordered by a court. Accordingly, this 
increased risk of litigation is likely to dissuade employers from enacting 
employer-mandated medical examination and inquiry policies. For employ-
ers with policies already in place, it may encourage them to abandon them 
altogether. 
Some legal scholars have expressed resistance to the majority rule.117 
These scholars argue that employers with incumbent employees in remote 
locations, or in dangerous jobs, should be entitled to an exception from the 
majority rule.118 Such an exception, however, already exists in both a statu-
tory reading of the ADA119 and in the majority rule as expressed in Conroy’s 
vital-business-interests test.120 Basically, the majority rule would remain 
applicable to a hypothetical set of facts where an offshore oil driller working 
on a rig suffers a massive heart attack while on the job, which could poten-
tially cause a major disaster.121 Under the majority rule, in this scenario an 
employer is still likely to prevail against any claim that its medical inquiry 
policy neither preserves a vital business interest nor is unnecessary to pro-
tect the health and safety of its workers. 
Indeed, the majority rule is malleable, and depends on the facts of the 
case under review.122 The majority rule contemplates that there may be cer-
  
 116. Id. 
 117. See Jarod S. Gonzalez, A Matter of Life and Death—Why the ADA Permits Manda-
tory Periodic Medical Examinations of “Remote-Location” Employees, 66 LA. L. REV. 681, 
716 (2006).  
 118. Id. 
 119. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2006). 
 120. See Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 121. See Gonzalez, supra note 117, at 682–83. 
 122. See Conroy, 333 F.3d at 98. 
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tain jobs, such as the hypothetical oil driller, that permit an employer to in-
quire further into an incumbent employee’s present ability to perform essen-
tial work-related tasks. Courts need not run the risk of creating additional 
restraints on the ADA’s effectiveness by creating additional exceptions to 
the statute when such exceptions already exist in both the statute itself and 
in the majority of court opinions interpreting the statute’s applicability. 
2. All Individuals, Including Incumbent Employees and Their Family 
Members, are Entitled to a Reasonable Expectation of Medical 
Privacy That the Majority Rule Would Protect 
In 1983, the Sixth Circuit held that “a person possesses no reasonable 
expectation that his medical history will remain completely confidential”; 
however, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that “a person has [an] interest in 
protecting, to some extent, the confidentiality of his medical records.”123 
Since then, a right to medical privacy has been consistently recognized in 
other courts. The Third Circuit has acknowledged that an incumbent em-
ployee’s medical records, records of prescription medication, and other per-
sonal medical information are all entitled to privacy protections.124 
Some courts have gone further than the Third Circuit, holding that both 
individuals infected with AIDS and their family members have a constitu-
tional right to privacy regarding that diagnosis.125 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Doe court126 relied upon Whalen v. Roe,127 which held that the U.S. 
Constitution recognized an “interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal 
matters.”128 Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that a right 
to privacy could prevent the disclosure of a family member’s medical condi-
tion.129 
Although a universal theory on whether individuals, or their family 
members, possess a right to privacy protecting their medical records from 
involuntary disclosure has yet to develop, any judicial opinion that construc-
tively erodes this right is an unfavorable policy to uphold. This notion is 
especially true in the case of heavily stigmatized, feared, or otherwise mis-
  
 123. In re Subpoena Served Upon Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 641 (6th Cir. 1983).  
 124. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980). 
But see Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that no right to confi-
dentiality regarding medical records existed).  
 125. See Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990). 
 126. Id. (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)). 
 127. 429 U.S. at 599–600. 
 128. Id. at 599. 
 129. See Hansen v. J.L. Hammett Int’l., Inc., No. A 9800849, 1999 WL 1073649, at *3 
(Mass. Sup. Ct. Sept. 2, 1999). But see Fitch v. Voit, 624 So. 2d 542, 543 (Ala. 1993) (hold-
ing “that the right to privacy is a personal right” and that no “relational right of privacy” 
extends to family members). 
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understood illnesses.130 In the same vein, public sentiment and judicial back-
lash against the ADA have been eroding the protection of incumbent em-
ployees against discrimination in a manner that Congress did not intend.131 
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Lee has the operative effect of continuing this 
erosion in a manner inconsistent with Congress’s intent. Although the busi-
ness-necessity exception is still sound policy, the threat of incumbent em-
ployee discrimination still exists if the incumbent employee is required to 
disclose the nature of his or her family member’s illness. 
For example, assume that a husband needs to take a week off from 
work to tend to his wife who is suffering from HIV or AIDS. It is not diffi-
cult to imagine the husband’s employer will now assume that the husband 
also suffers from HIV or AIDS, despite not having any information to cor-
roborate that belief. Given the continued stigma that accompanies individu-
als with HIV or AIDS, a judicial policy that departs from the majority rule is 
unsound. 
3. The Majority Rule is the Favorable Approach Because It Would 
Also Have a Positive Effect on Family Caregivers, or, at a Mini-
mum, It Would Not Discourage Individuals from Assuming a 
Caregiving Role 
As a policy matter, the holding in Lee is likely to have a negative effect 
on family caregivers, who often take time off of work to tend to close family 
members. A policy requiring incumbent employees to disclose the nature of 
their family members’ illnesses after taking extended sick leave is likely to 
discourage incumbent employees from assuming a caregiving role. 
The role of a caregiver is an important role in today’s society. Nearly 
everyone has been required to, or knows someone who has been required to, 
take time off from work to care for a loved one suffering from an illness or a 
disability. Policies benefiting caregivers have a positive impact on society as 
a whole. Such impacts include the absence of neglect for children who do 
  
 130. See Tony R. Maida, Note and Comment, How Judicial Myopia is Jeopardizing the 
Protection of People with HIV/AIDS Under the ADA, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 303 (2001). 
Mr. Maida also mentions that individuals diagnosed with HIV or AIDS will always be a 
protected class because of the ADA’s “record of” prong. Id. at 320. Specifically, the “record 
of” prong applies to individuals with HIV or AIDS because they have a “record of” a disabil-
ity through their HIV-positive diagnosis. Id. This diagnosis follows them indefinitely until a 
cure is found. Id. Such an analysis dovetails with a similar analysis by Long, who found that 
judicial erosion of the ADA had a particularly profound effect on “record of” claims. See 
Long, supra note 105, at 676 (“[T]hrough a string of restrictive interpretations by the federal 
courts involving all three prongs of the ADA’s definition of disability, the ‘record of’ prong 
is almost the vestigial definition of discrimination under the ADA, serving no independent 
purpose in the eyes of most ADA plaintiffs.”). 
 131. See Maida, supra note 130, at 302–03. 
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not have the presence of a caregiver at home, especially when the absence of 
a caregiver often has negative effects on both the child and the child’s fami-
ly.132 
Legal scholars have continually supported policies that favor caregiv-
ers, particularly for individuals who perform dual roles of full-time employ-
ee on the job and full-time caregiver at home.133 Individuals who perform 
the dual role of both often violate their employer’s attendance policy.134  
The decision to become a caregiver is not always voluntary. Sometimes 
individuals are “forced into [the] role[] because of the sudden [onset of an] 
illness, injury, or disability of a loved one.”135 More often than not, those 
that fill the role of caregiver tend to be women,136 and any judicial enforce-
ment of employer-friendly attendance policies that dissuade caregivers from 
tending to their duties at home is likely to include an additional element of 
gender discrimination.137 Rigid attendance policies compound the prob-
lem.138 
It does not have to be this way. Judicial policy can be geared toward 
favoring caregivers, and court opinions can be constructed within the 
framework of the ADA to give employers an incentive to provide caregivers 
with reasonable accommodations.139 By using the ADA as its backbone, 
judicial reforms can ameliorate the effects of discrimination against women, 
who traditionally perform the role of caregiver.140 Court opinions can also 
assist in curing the cognitive bias, a form of stereotyping, that typically at-
taches to female caregivers141 but may also attach in a more invidious way to 
  
 132. See Porter, supra note 13, at 410–11. 
 133. See id. at 357. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 380. 
 136. Id. at 357–58. 
 137. See id. at 362 (“Prevailing workplace practices remain firmly anchored to an ideal-
worker norm that embodies the traditional life patterns of men.”) (citing Joan C. Williams & 
Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing Trend of Family Responsi-
bilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171, 173–74 (2006)); id. at 363 (“The number of 
women affected by stringent attendance policies is staggering, and most of these women are 
in the lowest income brackets.”) (citing Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treat-
ment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, THE U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html). 
 138. See Porter, supra note 13, at 362 (“Some employers allow as few as six to eight 
absences or partial-day absences in an entire year regardless of the reason.”). 
 139. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentiv-
ized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH 
L. REV. 25, 39–40 (2007). 
 140. Id. at 37. Professor Arnow-Richman concedes, however, that reform is unlikely to 
come from the courts, but, instead, from Congress. Id. at 38. 
 141. Id. at 40. 
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men.142 Moreover, any complaints that an employer’s policy favoring care-
givers is likely to be cost-prohibitive are unpersuasive.143 Indeed, it is likely 
that any cost for these policies will be “offset by increased employee mo-
rale, loyalty, and retention.”144 
Judicial opinions inapposite of the majority rule are likely to counter 
these favored policy approaches to family caregivers. Individuals who are 
considering becoming a caregiver are unlikely to assume the role if an em-
ployer’s attendance policy is stringent or unfavorable to them. Imagine how 
these individuals would react when that policy also requires disclosure in 
explicit detail for why they are taking extended sick leave. Some parents 
would like their children’s ailments, illnesses, or disabilities to remain pri-
vate. Others may not be prepared to disclose to their employer that their 
spouse is dying. Many may be disinclined to confess that one or more par-
ents have had to move in with them because they are no longer able to take 
care of themselves. Or, perhaps, some people would prefer that matters in-
volving their family stay in the family. Lee’s departure from the majority 
rule prevents all of the above. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Has the Sixth Circuit gone too far in allowing employers to require in-
cumbent employees to provide a doctor’s note after returning from extended 
sick leave? Arguably, yes. Prior to Lee, the Second Circuit’s ruling in 
Conroy was well-established as the majority rule. Circuit courts following 
the Second Circuit’s approach in Conroy agreed that the majority rule best 
served the ADA’s mission by preventing employers from passively discov-
ering an incumbent employee’s disability through involuntary medical ex-
amination and inquiry programs. The majority rule is also sufficiently mal-
leable with regard to employees in remote locations or dangerous jobs, and, 
therefore, it is likely that a substantial portion of the Columbus policy would 
have been upheld had the Sixth Circuit followed the majority rule.  
Because the Sixth Circuit departed from this standard, several issues 
arise under its analysis. As a practical matter, the ruling drastically expands 
an employer’s ability to compel the disclosure of private medical infor-
mation about both incumbent employees and their families. In so doing, the 
Sixth Circuit’s ruling goes against the preferable policy approach on this 
issue. Although employers are likely to applaud the ruling for preventing 
  
 142. Id. at 41 (“Some have suggested that men who deviate from the stereotypical male 
work pattern by assuming significant caregiving responsibilities encounter explicit harass-
ment.”). 
 143. Id.  
 144. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrated Approach to Solving 
the Caregiver Conundrum for “Real” Workers, 39 STETSON L. REV. 777, 856 (2010). 
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incumbent employees from abusing their attendance policies, such a victory 
comes at too great a cost.  
The Sixth Circuit’s departure from the majority rule goes against an al-
ready-established approach to employer-mandated medical examinations 
and inquiries that legal scholars have championed as being aligned with the 
ADA’s broader goals and objectives. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling 
will erode both incumbent employees’, and their family members’, more 
than reasonable expectations of a right to medical privacy. A refusal to fol-
low the majority rule is also likely to have a significant impact on family 
caregivers. Indeed, a further ratification of the majority rule would have had 
a positive effect on family caregivers, thus, encouraging people to (or, at the 
very least, not discouraging people from) assuming the role of a family 
caregiver. 
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